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THE "NEW CONSERVATISM" IN
CONTRACT LAW AND THE PROCESS OF
LEGAL CHANGE
ROBERT A. HILLMAN*
This essay raises four related and important questions. First, what
do analysts mean when they assert that there is a "new conservatism"
in contract law?' Second, is there evidence to support their claim?
Third, assuming at least some recent and interesting change in the
judicial approach to contract law, what caused the change? Finally,
what does the new approach, whatever it is called, indicate about the
nature of private contract law and the process of legal change? All of
these questions are incredibly complex and daunting. Here I present
only some tentative views.
I. WHAT DOES "NEW CONSERVATISM" IN CONTRACT LAW MEAN?
I shall discuss the definitions of "new conservatism" set forth by
others who have commented on recent developments in private law.
First, the "new conservatism" constitutes a "retrenchment" in the ex-
tent to which private contract law protects the underclasses. For exam-
ple, one analyst has written that recent contract decisions demon-
strate a "judicial tilt away from underdogs, back toward the privileged
beneficiaries of classical contract law."' Second, the "new conservatism"
constitutes a more formal, inflexible and rule-oriented application of
* Edwin Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Greg Alexander, Kevin
Clermont, and Jim Henderson for reading the manuscript. David Becker, David Passey, and
Cynthia Quimby provided excellent research assistance.
1 The term was used in the title of the joint program on contract, property, and tort law at
the 1998 annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools. See Jay Feinman, Notes to
AALS Joint Program on Contract, Property, and Tort Law, San Francisco (Jan. 11, 1998) (unpub-
lished, on file with the American Association of Law Schools); see also Ralph James Mooney, The
New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
2 Mooney, supra note 1, at 1170-71. In his important and provocative article, Professor
Mooney calls this "new conceptualism," but asserts that it "reflects and reinforces" a "resurgent
intellectual and political conservatism" in contract law. Id. at 1135; see also Kerry L. Macintosh,
Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
483, 515 (1994) (arguing that tort remedies have been rejected "in favor of traditional, limited
contract remedies"); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Con-
sent?, 62 BitooR. L. REV. 1335, 1354 (1996) ("According to the courts, the absence of equal
bargaining power or the opportunity to bargain does not necessarily signal unfair surprise or
oppression . . . .").
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contract law. 3
 Indeed, commentators see a link between these two
characteristics of today's contract law. 4
 They reason that courts fixated
on creating and applying "rules" tend to preserve and protect society's
elites. This is because rules deter courts from assessing both the fair-
ness of the bargaining process and the resulting exchange in situations
where the stronger party can dictate terms. 5 Rules also bar courts from
enforcing the stronger party's oral inducements that are omitted from
the written contract.°
There is, of course, plenty to quarrel about within these defini-
tions and explanations of "new conservatism." For example, is contract
law that favors elites or prefers rules over standards necessarily conser-
vative? Do contract "rules" inherently favor the stronger party? Because
labeling is both controversial and unnecessary for the issues discussed
here, I shall dispense with the reference to "new conservatism" wher-
ever possible. Regardless of what we call formal contract law that favors
elites, a more interesting question is whether these characteristics
actually exist in today's contract law.
IL DO RECENT DECISIONS DEMONSTRATE A TURN TO FORMAL
CONTRACT LAW THAT FAVORS ELITES?
I am unconvinced that 1990s contract law has increasingly favored
"economically privileged parties. "7 The claim appears to be based in
part on a "trend" in recent decisions to favor "sellers, banks, insurers,
and employers" over "buyers, borrowers, policyholders, and employ-
3 See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1133-34; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract
Law During the 1980s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 203-04, 225 (1990) (claiming that
in the 1980s courts ended the expansion of unconscionability and retreated from accepting
changed circumstances or impracticability); Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain
of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 254 (1995) ("A consensus extracted from this Symposium is
that ... conceptualism has indeed been reborn (if it ever died) in the guise of a new formalism
. ."). See generally Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formulism, 90 Nw. U. L. REV, 89, 91-94
(1995) (discussing the periods of American formalism).
4
 "Conceptualist decisionmaking has, in general, profoundly conservative political implica-
tions." Mooney, supra note 1, at 1135; see alsoJames A. Webster, Comment, A Pound of Flesh: The
Oregon Supreme Court Virtually Eliminates the Duty to Perform & Enforce Contracts in Good Faith,
75 OR. L. REV. 493, 508 (1996) ("According to the realists, the law had become tailored to the
interests of those in superior bargaining positions, who could take refuge in formalist doctrines
such as the parol evidence rule to enforce the written terms of a contract, and simultaneously
keep from the trier of fact the evidence of the parties' actual agreement, which frequently resided
outside of the written contract.").
5 See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1132, 1206; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1147; see also Webster, supra note 4, at 508.
7 See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1135.
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ees."8 The problem is that, in the cases identified to support the claim
or as an abstract matter, the former parties are not always "privileged"
and the latter parties are not always "underdogs." For example, the
losing parties in cases that supposedly evidence the "new conservatism"
include land developers, commercial buyers, contractors, and business
lessees (the latter even including the Oakland Raiders), In addition,
many contracts cases in the 1990s protect true underdogs, so it is
difficult to establish any "trend."
Similarly, recent contract cases do not appear to exemplify a genu-
ine paradigm shift away from flexibility and egalitarianism toward "the
abstract conceptualism of classical contract law." 11 It is true that some
recent cases have, for example, applied the "indefiniteness" doctrine
to dismiss claims and the parol evidence rule to bar the admissibility
of evidence to interpret terms, while others balked at enforcing agree-
ments-to-agree." This "trend" allegedly evidences a "resurrection" of
formal rules that prevent enforcement of the true agreement between
the parties." These rules have always existed in courts' arsenals, how-
ever, and I doubt that their recent use constitutes a major change in
the direction of contract law. Moreover, many recent cases appear to
buck this "trend." 14 I am more comfortable with the proposition that
8 Id. at 1206.
9 See, e.g., Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Alaska Diversified Contractors Inc., 734 P.2d 62
(Alaska 1987) (losing party a contractor); Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666
P.2d 33 (Alaska 1983) (losing party a commercial buyer); Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum,
Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 243 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (losing party the Oakland
Raiders); Ciampi tt v. A.M.R. Corp., 706 P.2d 34 (Idaho 1985) (losing party a developer). The best
support for the proposition that underdogs frequently lose is in the employment arena because
of the presumption of "at-will" employment. See Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Cu -.. 265 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
"See, e.g., Velarde v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 105 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997)
(employer's attempt to introduce parol evidence excluded); Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.,
926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996) (employee may proceed on express and implied contract, promissory
estoppel, quasi-contract, breach of good faith and tort against employer); Cox v. Lewiston Grain
Growers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (seed company's disclaimer of warranties and
limited remedy unenforceable).
II SeeMooney, supra note 1, at 1132-33; see, e.g., Margaret N. Kniffin, A New 'Rend in Contract
Interpretation: The Search for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 Ott. L. REV. 643, 644 (1995)
(arguing that courts allow unrestricted extrinsic evidence); Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really
"Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. 1.
REV. 1145, 1162 (1998) ("Illn significant respects, contemporary contract interpretation has
come to reject the classical model."). Professor Mooney sometimes writes only in terms of "tilts,"
but in his conclusion he refers to the cases he discusses as a "considerable and alarming retreat"
from the Realist movement. Mooney, supra note 1, at 1205.
12 Mooney, supra note 1, at 1136-39, 1145-46, 1170.
12 See id. at 1170.
" See, e.g., Reeves, 926 P.2d at 1142 (employee able to proceed on a claim of restitution);
Feurzeig v. Insurance Co. of the W., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (taking into
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recent reported decisions demonstrate an incremental enhancement
of rules that favor the enforcement of written contracts over alleged
oral, less formal representations or agreements. My own study of prom-
issory estoppel cases in the mid-1990s illustrates the dramatic lack of
success of the promissory estoppel theory which, in part, stems from
a preference for the enforcement of written contracts."
A judicial preference for rules that favor written contracts, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that courts are less likely to enforce
real agreements between parties. After all, if the parties' agreement is
indefinite on important terms and the parties disagree about the
content of those terms, or if the parties debate whether they even
entered into an enforceable agreement, it is not self-evident why en-
forcement of a contract more often than not supports the real agree-
ment between the parties. Similarly, if one party wants to introduce
extrinsic evidence contradicting a written contract, it is not clear why
admitting that evidence more likely furthers the parties' real linen-
dons.
It is even less clear why a judicial preference for rules that favor
written contracts more often than not benefits one group over another.
Rules that support written contracts can protect underdogs as well as
disadvantage them. One need only think of the recent practice of long
distance telephone carriers to change a customer's service provider
without consent." The FCC's response was to promulgate rules requir-
ing written evidence of a customer's intent to change service provid-
ers. 17
I will not try to resolve here whether the recent judicial trend
toward rules that favor written contracts should be praised or la-
mented. The arguments are well-rehearsed" and boil down to an
account the insured's sophistication); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P,2d 222, 230 (Wash. 1990) (low-
ering most barriers to extrinsic evidence).
15 See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel• An Empiri-
cal and Theoretical Study, 98 CoLum. L. REV. 580 (1998).
16 See In re Unauthorized Changes of Consumers' Long Distance Carrier, 10 F.C.C.R. 9560,
9579 (1995).
17 See id. In addition, before an advocate of purchasers of consumer goods would want to
reject the paradigm of written contracts, she would have to be convinced that nefarious sellers
make and then deny oral representations that favor buyers (such as product warranties) more
often than they falsely assert oral terms that hurt buyers (such as terms providing for additional
compensation).
16 See generally Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 186-90 (1965) (demonstrating importance of extrinsic evidence); Helen
Hadjiyannalds, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, 54 FOROHAM L.
REV. 35, 61-62 (1985) (advocating that an "increased confidence in the reliability of oral testi-
mony" has occurred concurrently with a "decreased belief in the sanctity of written contracts");
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empirical question of whether one approach or the other better deters
fraud and opportunism in the formation and performance of con-
tracts.' 9 Despite claims one way or the other, the empirical evidence
has neither been collected nor is it readily obtainable. 20 I turn instead
to the important question of what accounts for the trend toward the
enforcement of written contracts.
III. WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE NEW EMPHASIS ON WRITTEN
CONTRACTS?
If there is a new judicial emphasis on the enforcement of written
contracts, what accounts for it? I offer a two-part explanation for this
"tilt" in the law. First, it is not a stretch to say that public opinion about
the merits of the welfare state, the role of courts in a democratic society,
and the importance and power of markets changed during the 1980s
and early 1990s.21 Specifically, people have become more distrustful of
big government, more wary of non-democratic institutions such as the
judiciary, and more respectful of market exchange. My second and
more controversial assertion is that judicial decisions applying private
law reflect these changes in public opinion.
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704, 746-47 (1931)
(acknowledging the costs and benefits of enforcing written agreements); Morris G. Shanker, In
Defense of the Sales Statute of Frauds and Parole Evidence Rule: A Fair Price of Admission to the
Courts, 100 Com. U. 259, 260 (1995) (focusing on misunderstandings inherent in oral commu-
nication); L. Vold, The Application of the Statute of Frauds Under the Uniform Sales Act, 15 MINN.
L. REV. 391,393-94 (1931) (arguing that writing prevents fraud and prevents misunderstandings).
"The dominance of one approach or another will have real consequences for particular
litigants, of course. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
" To get a good feel for the importance of empirical evidence in a related area, and the
immense barriers to obtaining it (and hence the ultimate indeterminacy of policy analysis), one
should read the symposium in the Cornell Law Review, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1279 (1997). Most of the contributors, including the drafters of the new Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, lament the lack of empirical evidence and comment on the difficul-
ties of collecting it. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and
Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1349, 1370 (1997) ("Empirical testing of our hypotheses concerning the behavioral effects
(or lack thereof) of both current law and a subordination [of a secured creditor priority] regime
will be enormously difficult."); see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information..
The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1382 (1997) ("In the Article 9 reform
process three observations about empirical studies are important: 1) we cannot wait for the
definitive study before we make policy decisions, 2) we have to acknowledge that any empirical
evidence is likely to be indirect and only suggestive, and 3) we have to be more creative in our
approaches to gathering empirical data.").
21 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, A Revolution Subsides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A27; John B.
Judis, Democrats' White Middle Class Woes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1996, at 4.
884	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 40:879
The reasons for changes in public opinion are obviously very com-
plex. Still, perspectives are undoubtedly influenced by major events,
distinct trends, and vivid symbols,22 such as the fall of communism, the
failure of "War on Poverty" welfare programs to improve conditions
for the poor," and the significant decrease in unskilled workers' real
wages during a period of rising taxes. 24 Such events, trends, and sym-
bols ignited both intellectual writers and interest groups committed to
the cause of diminished government to further attempt to influence
public perceptions." Combined with people's natural tendency to be-
come impatient with, and challenge, the status quo,26 this environment
created the appropriate recipe for a transformation in public opinion.
In such an environment, it is unremarkable that legislative policy
would reflect shifts in public opinion. 27 More controversial is the asser-
tion that judges allow public opinion to influence decisions in which
they apply private law28 and, more specifically, that public opinion has
contributed to a move by judges to prefer written contracts.
Another possible explanation for the change in judicial approach
is that plaintiffs, encouraged by the previous willingness of courts
" See William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth
Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 319-15, 328 n.231 (quoting Mark H. Moore, What Sort of Ideas
Become Public Ideas?, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 55, 83 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1990) ("(1)cleas
seem to become anchored in people's minds through illustrative anecdotes, simple diagrams and
pictures . . .")).
23 See, e.g., James Traub, Nathan Glazer Changes His Mind Again, N.Y. Timm, June 28, 1998,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 24.
24 SeeJudis, supra note 21, at 4. "[Slymbols dominate the large discussion because they evoke
vivid images that abstract policy norms do not." Blatt, supra note 22, at 328.
45 Stephan Salisbury, Right Turn, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 1997, at E3 (funding of
conservative groups by philanthropies influences conservative shift).
"See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1986) ("With
the acceleration in the rate of social change, humans become creatures characterized by inextin-
guishable discontent.").
27 See Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. PoL.
SC!. REV. 75 (1983).
2s Information regarding the effect of public opinion on judges is anecdotal and sketchy. See
Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95
CoLum. L. REV. 1811, 1836-37 (1995). Nevertheless, academics and judges turn to public opinion
surprisingly often in order to mount arguments for legal change. See generally Marjorie M. Shultz,
Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 328-34 (1982)
(arguing changes in public norms require modernization of marriage law); Peter IL Teachout,
Uneasy Burden: What it Really Means to Learn to Think Like a Lawyer, 47 MERCER L. REV. 593,
569 (1996) (suggesting that law should require a limited duty to rescue based in part on "a general
societal judgment"); Michael Tonsing, Punitive Damages: A Candle in the Wind, 43 FED. LAW. 8,
9 (1996) (referring to a judge who wrote that "it is in our view offensive to public opinion, and
rightly so, that a defamation plaintiff should recover damages from injury to reputation greater,
by a significant factor, than if that same plaintiff had been rendered a helpless cripple or an
insensate vegetable").
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to find obligations outside of written contracts, brought increasingly
weaker cases for doing so. Thus, a case-selection effect could explain
the trend toward decisions emphasizing the importance of written
contracts. Indeed, there are other plausible explanations for the new
emphasis on written contracts. 29
Perhaps a case-selection effect or another reason explains some
of the shift in doctrine, but I want to emphasize the importance of
public opinion because "the atmosphere of opinion cannot be shut
out of . . . court rooms. "s0 Of course, judges are supposed to resist
public opinion and decide cases based on the rule of law. No doubt
judges are often successful in withstanding fleeting changes in attitudes
caused, for example, by publicity over a particular event (such as
lawyer-instigated publicity designed as strategy in a particular trial) . 31
When public opinion takes the form of sustained, generalized changes
in perspectives and values, however, judges are, for many reasons, far
less likely to resist the tide." For example, a public perspective may
become so dominant that a judge may take it for granted and incor-
porate it subconsciously. 35 In addition, judges may openly embrace
public opinion because they believe good policy decisions should con-
" For example, the power of a judge's rhetoric alone might persuade other courts to follow
a new approach. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 148-55 (1990);
Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power,"
56 OHIO ST. L. J. 775 (1995).
"WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (1911); see
also Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 1LL. L. REV. 96, 102 (1922) ("Decisions often result from
changing social conditions. . ."). For a recent discussion, see Patricia M. Wald, A Response to
Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 235, 235 (1999) ("11judges as human beings, cannot help
but be influenced by their life experiences.").
31 See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2381, 2402 (1997) ("The passion of the moment and streets must almost always be kept a safe
distance away from the courthouse."). For a good discussion of public opinion, see Moses, supra
note 28, at 1831.
32 See Ruti G. Teitel, edited transcript published in Symposium, Nazis in the Courtroom: Lessons
from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, Prance, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1153 (1995) ("[T]he fact that the law is written is only one element of what
makes law positive and . . . there are others, such as a broader understanding of . . . public
perception."); see also Bellacosa, supra note 31, at 2393-94 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 152 (1921) ("If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores
of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in
helpless submission, the hands of their successors.")).
"Perhaps Justice Rehnquist said it best:
Somewhere "out there"—beyond the walls of the courthouse—run currents and
tides of public opinion which lap at the courthouse door . . . [I]f these tides of
public opinion are sufficiently great and sufficiently sustained, they will very likely
have an effect upon the decision of some of the cases decided within the court-
house. This is not a case of judges "knuckling under" to public opinion and cravenly
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sider the "value preferences" of the citizenry. 34 Further, judges may
adopt public opinion to enhance or maintain their reputations or, in
the case of elected judges, to solidify their hold on their positions."
For better or worse, then, the tide of opinion embracing private
markets and judicial restraint, and rejecting government regulation
and judicial activism, appears to have reached the courts. Moreover,
such public opinion has contributed to decisions that sanctify written
contracts, which are, of course, the archetypical form of exchange in
a world of free markets and "freedom of contract."
1V. THE NEW EMPHASIS ON WRITTEN CONTRACTS AND THE PROCESS
OF LEGAL CHANGE
This section asserts that the capacity of the common law to
change, evolve and adjust, reflected in the new emphasis on written
contracts, demonstrates a healthy, functioning legal system.
A healthy legal system is neither too static nor too dynamic."
Instead, the components of the system, such as lawmakers, lawyers,
citizens, institutions, and structures, are permanently changing and
adapting to one another. Complexity theorists refer to systems that
exhibit such characteristics as being "on the edge of chaos" and believe
that this state ensures survival of the system." For example, Professor
abandoning their oaths of office. Judges, as long as they are relatively normal
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long
run than can people working at other jobs.
William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 Suvrotic U. L. REv. 751, 768
(1986).
34 Cf. Blatt, supra note 22, at 331 (discussing the "extraction of specific policy goals from
popular symbols").
35
 In 1994, the American judicature Society reported that 27.6% of state judges indicated
that they were "more sensitive to public opinion" because of retention elections. SeeJohn Gibeaut,
Tatting Aim, 82 A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (1996); see also Norman Dorset', How American Judges Interpret
the Bill of Rights, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 379, 388 (1994). There, Dorsen states:
[P]ublic opinion has a powerful effect on judges, including Supreme Court justices,
even though lifetime tenure insulates them from crass retribution for their deci-
sions. . . . Put another way, judges ... do not live in a disembodied vacuum, but
exist as part of the hard real world where their decisions will be closely reviewed by
every segment of society and ultimately redound to each judge's enhanced or
impaired reputation. This is bound to influence decision-making.
But see Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. Rev. 1107, 1127
(1995) (arguing that lifetime judges can resist public opinion).
36 See Bellacosa, supra note 31, at 2393 ("The paradoxical swings, tensions, and realities in
law and jurisprudence temper the necessity of having to rule in cases without the benefit of
perfectly clear vision and knowledge.").
37 See M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER
AND CHAOS 293, 320-22, 330 (1992).
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Reynolds has utilized complexity theory to show that adaptation and
change in government ensures that no particular coalition or group
can permanently enjoy the upper hand." Instead, government is a
"moving target" that avoids stagnation and "status quo" politics."
If contract law is "on the edge of chaos," we can expect further
movement on questions such as whether to create and enforce rules
that favor written contracts. Indeed, at some point, the pendulum is
likely to swing in the direction of de-emphasizing written contracts. 4°
Impatience of the citizenry with the legal and political status quo will
again prime the pump. Then events and trends that underscore and
symbolize the importance of government's role in society will trans-
form public opinion, which, in turn, will influence the judicial appli-
cation of contract law. Judges will become more active because they
will perceive that the written-contract filter precludes enforcement of
too many "real" agreements and representations. These observations
about legal change are, of course, hardly a revelation. Arthur Schlesin-
ger Jr. posited the existence of "political cycle[s]," consisting of "a
continuing shift in national involvement, between public purpose and
private interest."41 Grant Gilmore observed the "alternating rhythms of
classicism and romanticism" in literature and the arts and their impli-
cations for law.42
[R]ight in between the two extremes [of order and chaos] ... at a kind of abstract
phase transition called "the edge of chaos," you also find complexity: a class of
behaviors in which the components of the system never quite lock into place, yet
never quite dissolve into turbulence either. . . . These are the systems that can be
organized to perform complex computations, to react to the world, to be sponta-
neous, adaptive, and alive.
Id. at 293.
"Glen Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VANE,. L. REV. 1635, 1645 (1995).
"Id. at 1646.
"A new trend may already have begun. See, e.g., Velarde v, Pace Membership Warehouse,
105 F.34.1 1313 (9th Cir. 1997) (employer's invocation of parol evidence rule denied); Powers v.
Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (although finding an
arbitration clause binding, the court approved of precedent invoking exceptions to binding
arbitration); Fillinger v. Northwestern Agency, Inc., 938 P.2d 1347 (Mont. 1997) (no "absolute"
duty to read insurance policy). See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good
Faith, Norms, and the Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 399 (1997).
41 SCHLESINGER, supra note 26, at 27.
42 GRANT GnatottE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 112 (2d ed. 1995). For an imaginative effort
to account for the "oscillations between periods of intense preoccupation with public issues and
of almost total concentration on individual improvement and private welfare goals," see ALBERT
HIRSCIIMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS 3 (1982) (each stage creates "disappointment," which leads
to change).
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The middle and late 1990s have already seen a change in public
opinion that will lead to a new "tilt" in doctrine." The public exhibited
a great deal of sympathy for striking UPS workers." Public opinion
endorsed boosting the minimum wage.* The public, including Reagan
Democrats, disapproved of Newt Gingrich's extremist strategies.46 if my
argument about the connection between public opinion and judicial
decisions is correct, judicial decisions will, in time, reflect the change
in public opinion,47 with some analysts inevitably lamenting "the new
liberalism" in contract law.
Obviously, all is not rosy with this picture of legal change. One
problem is that at any given time there are real costs to real people
who are out of step with the prevailing view of the substantive law. Some
parties who lose promissory estoppel claims would probably win them
in an atmosphere that considers legal rules "protection" rather than
"intrusion." Moreover, only in such an environment would parol evi-
dence offered to rebut the terms of a written contract see the light of
day. Compounding the problem, judicial decisions begin to reflect
public opinion only after the passage of time. Therefore, a party may
lose a promissory estoppel claim when the tide of public opinion favors
the party, but this sentiment has not yet reached the courts.
An even larger problem is that public opinion may be unjust or
illogical, or it may contradict perfectly valid instrumental goals of the
law. There are, in fact, plenty of reasons why public opinion may suffer
from such infirmities: people may form their opinions based on defec-
tive or limited information:" people's expectations may be unreason-
ably low;" dominant interest groups may have too much influence over
public discourse:50
 and the public's perspective may be too fleeting.5 '





47 See supra note 43.
48 See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 794 (1994)
("people may be unaware of their alternatives" when forming opinions).
49 See id. ("If people expect to get nothing from the legal system, they may be pleasantly
surprised to receive a little.").
39 See id. ("[A] dominant group can define the consciousness of an entire society .. . .").
31 See Douglas Lind, Free Legal Decision and the Interpretive Return in Modern Legal Theory,
38 AM. J. JURIS. 159, 179 (1993) (Public opinion may be too "unstable an indicia of legal
meaning.").
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On the other hand, when people form a "broad value consensus
on core beliefs,"52 there are good reasons for judges to pay attention.
Stagnant law that deflects public discourse may be more costly and
unjust than law that encompasses the tide of opinion." Moreover, our
deeply ingrained American values, goals and traditions—including
individualism and entrepreneurshipm on the one hand, and coopera-
tion and communitarianism on the other—should ordinarily form
boundaries and confine public opinion to acceptable, even desirable
parameters. Ultimately, in the unusual case, when public opinion is
seriously inconsistent with societal norms, judges should be able to
perceive the aberration and resist it. 55
For better or worse, this depiction of law suggests that law includes
what is written in the books, but it also encompasses public opinion
and even a judge's perception of public discourse. 56 Law is, therefore,
in part political, subjective, and indeterminate. Lawyers must be cog-
nizant not only of legal rules, but also of current events and political
and social tides. This is not to say that doctrine is unimportant. It
influences the actions of most parties, who never go to court. It decides
many cases. Nevertheless, in the close case a lawyer should never focus
solely on legal rules.
5S;
	 & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 795.
55 See Teitel, supra note 32, at 1153 ("ln a totalitarian country, we might very well expect a
gap between the law as it is written and the people's understanding of the law. . . . The danger
sign is clear: lack of integration between the public perception of law as lawful and the law as
written."). A good example of a set of rules in need of overhaul, at least in part because of
inattention to public opinion, are rules governing marriage. Although society is increasingly
tolerant of "pluralism in family forms," few laws allow marriage parties to personalize their own
arrangements. See Marjorie M. Shultz, supra note 28, at 247 (quoting Marvin B. Sussman, Family
Systems in the 1970s: Analysis, Policies and Programs, 596 ANNALS 40, 42 (1971)).
54 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 20, at 1371 ("Entrepreneurship is an indelible feature of
the American social fabric.").
55 See Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for
the Criminal Justice System, 69 S. CAL. L Rev. 1627, 1654 n.111 (1996) ("Appellate courts almost
uniformly have presumed that the judges can withstand the pressures [of public opinion] and
decide cases independently.").
56 See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 32, at 1155 (referring to a "multiplicity of sources of the rule
of law" including "societal consensus"). Other factors determining outcomes include a judge's
personal values and her evaluation of the instrumental effects of a decision.
